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Abstract
In this work project, we use micro data from the Household Budget Survey
wave of 2010 to measure the extent of progressivity of income and VAT taxes,
together with social security contributions. We use the witholding tax rates to
convert the net-at-source-income reported by the individuals in the survey into gross
income, and then, through a careful implementation of the details of the income
tax system, compute the net income. The identification of tax units and use of
gross income allows for improvements on previous literature. We use the Reynolds-
Smolensky and Kiefer indices to compute the progressivity of the several components
of the tax system, i.e., (i) social security contributions; (ii) income taxes, including
tax credits and deductions; (iii) witholding taxes, and, (iv) value added tax on
final consumption goods and services. Behavioural responses to taxation are also
inspected. Income tax is found to be progressive, with withheld taxation being more
progressive than final taxes. Tax deductions are found to be more regressive than
tax credits, and VAT is found to be regressive.
Keywords: Tax Progressivity, Public Finance, Portugal, Income taxes,
VAT taxes
JEL Classification: H22, H23, H24, H31
∗Thanks are due to my advisor, Susana Peralta for her patience and guidance; to my girlfriend, Sofia
Santos, as well as the rest of my family and friends, for the steadfast support; to esteemed colleagues at
the Ministry of Economy for the six months spent as Visiting Researcher; and to Pricewaterhousecoopers
for digging up their ‘Guia Fiscal’ from their archives. Finally, thanks are due to Emmanuel Saez for being
a guiding light in public finance research.






3 Literature Review: Measuring Progressivity 3
3.1 Gini-based indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 Equally-Distributed Equivalent Level of Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 The Portuguese tax system 7
4.1 Personal Income Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Social Security Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 Value-Added Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5 Data and Methodology 11
5.1 Net-Gross Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2 Tax Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 Behavioural Responses to Taxation 17
6.1 Bunching at Notches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2 Bunching at Kinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7 Results 20
7.1 Personal Income Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2 Social Security Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22




1 Timeline of disposable income and tax payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Changes in Top Income Shares and Top Marginal Tax Rates . . . . . . . . 3
3 Lorenz Curve and Gini Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 VAT revenues in Portugal: evolution and comparison with other countries . 11
5 Bunching at notches in employment income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6 Bunching at notches in self-employment income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7 Bunching at notches in property income and kinks in PIT . . . . . . . . . 19
8 Progression of Effective Retention Tax Rates and PIT Tax Rates . . . . . . 22
9 Progression of Effective VAT tax rates on consumption and income . . . . 23
10 Distribution of Average Propensity to Consume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
i
List of Tables
1 Gini-based tax progressivity indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Personal income tax schedule in mainland Portugal, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Tax expenditures in Portugal, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4 Household Budget Survey: descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5 Conversion rules for self-employment income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6 Notch-caused conversion ambiguities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7 Comparison of Estimatation Results with Tax Authority Statistics . . . . . 20
8 Progressivity Indices Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9 Self-employment SSC tax base, monthly values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10 Evolution of VAT schedule in mainland Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
ii
1 Introduction
While the level of the tax burden is issue of constant polemic, there is not one tax burden
but a distribution of tax burdens across income and demographic characteristics. Stable or
decreasing tax burdens for the whole may conceal increasing effective tax rates for a part
of the population. The graduation of taxes across income and demographic characteristics
is an essential feature of public finance policy design, with consequences across a range of
objectives from equity to stabilization (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000). Regardless then
of whether policymakers wish to enhance or dampen progressivity, it is relevant to know
to what extent a society’s taxes are progressive.
Progressivity is generally defined as effective average tax rates increasing with income.
Progressivity contributes to income redistribution and is usually sought by inequality-
averse polities and policymakers.
This work project seeks to estimate the progressivity of the tax system in Portugal as
it was in 2009. This section introduces the article. Subsequently, a framework of concepts
and notation is defined. Section 3 reviews literature and examines the range of progres-
sivity indices. Section 4 presents the portuguese tax system, facilitating a discussion on
key issues in tax policy design. Section 5 introduces the dataset and presents our net-
gross conversion model and tax unit identification strategy. Section 6 presents evidence
of behavioural responses to taxation, namely bunching at kinks and notches. Finally,
Section 7 presents results of our tax simulation model and computes progressivity indices
for the tax system as a whole as well as individual taxes and a number of counterfactual
scenarios. Section 8 concludes and presents limitations and areas for further research.
2 Framework
Individuals earn and spend income, y, which is distributed in the population according to
a density function, f(y) with the corresponding cumulative distribution function (CDF),
F (y).
Income distributions may also be expressed in terms of income shares, φ(y), with the
respective cumulative version, Φ(y), as expressed in (1). The progression of Φ(y) on F (y)










y · f(y) dy∫∞
0
y · f(y) dy
(1)
Gross income, yg is before-tax income, while net-of-tax income is denoted, yn. House-
holds expenditure c is also taxed. Personal income tax, t(y), as well as social security
contributions, s(y) are a function of income, while value-added tax is a function of expen-
diture, t(c). There are also a range of excise taxes for different kind of goods, including
petrol tax, alcohol tax, car tax, circulation tax and stamp duty.
In Portugal as in most OECD countries, personal income taxation takes place in two
moments - first upon payment, i.e., with witholding taxes, and then by submitting a tax
return in April/May of the following year, after which they may have to pay additional tax
or receive a refund. This has become a common feature of tax systems around the world,
with all OECD countries except Switzerland and France adopting the practice (OECD
1
2015). 1
Withheld tax creates an intermediate income level, termed ‘net-at-source income’ or
ys. The flow from gross income to net income through net-at-source income is described
by Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timeline of disposable income and tax payments
The withheld tax function, τ(y;P,D), and the income tax liability function, t(y;P,D),
reflect that t(y) and τ(y) vary not only by income, but also by demographic, D, and
professional characteristics, P . The relation of net and net-at-source income to gross
income are so defined:
yn = yg − t(y;P,D)− s(y), and ys = yg − τ(y;P,D)− s(y) (2)
For simplicity, we will refer to them hereafter as t(y) and τ(y).
The sum of individual incomes, yi, in a household, h, is the household income, yh.
Taxes are filed by tax unit, u. Tax units are subsets of households, and therefore tax unit
income, yu, is the sum of individual income in the tax unit.
We consider five categories, k, of income, yk: employment, y1, self-employment, y2,
pension, y3, capital, y4, and property income, y5. These correspond to the taxonomy in
Portuguese tax law, with the exception of increases in wealth which is unavailable in data.
The tax liability function, t(y), allows one to compute the marginal tax rate, t′(y), as
its derivative and the average tax rate, t(y)
yg
, as the ratio of tax liability on gross income.
Progressivity occurs where average rates are increasing with income. An equivalent defi-
nition of progressivity is where marginal rates exceed average rates (Musgrave and Thin,
1948: 498).
When analysing VAT progressivity, it is relevant to pursue this analysis for consump-
tion as well as income. Thus, the average rate of tax on consumption is the ratio between
tax and consumption, t(c)
c
.
Beyond setting tax rates and the income range over which they apply, policymakers
also define tax expenditures. These can be either tax deductions, δ, which are subtracted
from an individual’s gross income to form her adjusted gross income, ya, or tax credits,
χ, which are subtracted from an individual’s tax liability t(y). Furthermore, couples who
file their tax returns jointly benefit from a ‘couple quotient’, γ. In effect, this divides
adjusted income by the number of income-earners in the tax unit, computes tax liability
1France was planning to introduce a withholding tax system as of 1 January 2018. Vide EY, op. cit.
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and multiplies it again by γ. Thus, setting γ as the size of the tax unit, we can obtain
expressions for adjusted income and tax liability:






3 Literature Review: Measuring Progressivity
Tax progressivity is sought for both instrumental and intrinsic purposes - namely, reducing
inequality and promoting tax fairness.
It is clear that taxes and transfers play an important role in dampening inequality.
Joumard et al. (2012) estimate that in the late 2000s, taxes and transfers reduced about
inequality by about 25%, with about a quarter of this directly attributable to taxes.
However, the past 30 years has witnessed large-scale fiscal transformation with many
authors suggesting a decrease in progressivity, particularly in personal income taxes (PIT).
Peter et al. (2009: 2) find that globally “the GDP-weighted average top statutory
marginal PIT rate fell from 62% in 1981 to 42.9% in 1991 and by 2005 reached a twenty
five year low of 36.4%.”
As Piketty et al. (2014: 253) demonstrate, Portugal was one of the countries who
reduced the top marginal PIT rate the most as well as one of the countries where the
top 1% income share increased the most. Piketty et al.’s chart demonstrating a strong
correlation between reductions in the top marginal PIT rate and increases in the top 1%’s
income share is reproduced in Figure 2 below .
Figure 2: Changes in Top Income Shares and Top Marginal Tax Rates
Source: Piketty et al., 2014: 254
Meanwhile, lower income marginal rates have not been reduced at a similar rate,
resulting in a convergence of both marginal and average tax rates. One expression of this
is the reduction of the number of tax brackets. 10 times fewer countries had more than
20 PIT brackets in 2001-2005 than in 1981-1985. This reduction in brackets has been a
driver of income inequality. (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2010: 4-5)
The impact that less redistributive taxes have played in increasing inequality is well
grounded in the literature. (Ballarino et al.: 44) There are a variety of ethical, economic
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and other reasons why policymakers are averse to inequality and therefore seek tax pro-
gressivity. Inequality is negatively correlated with all forms of political, civic, social and
cultural participation, as well as with levels of political legitimacy. (Van de Werfhorst et
al., 2012) Top income shares have been found to be correlated with lower human well-being
(Burkhauser et al., 2016), while the seminal The Spirit Level has documented exhaus-
tively the correlations between income inequality and worse social outcomes (Wilkinson
and Pickett, 2009) From an economic point of view, Robert Gordon calls rising inequality
“the most important [headwind ]quantitatively in holding down the growth of our future
income” (Gordon 2012: 17).
The ‘ability-to-pay’ principle is the most common principle behind tax fairness and is
verified by tax burden increasing with ability to pay (i.e. income). While observing the
progression of the average tax rate allows one to conclude if a tax is progressive, it is not
in itself a measure of progressivity. It may not be straightforward to order tax systems
by progressivity or describe the extent of their progressivity. To do this, we need ‘a scalar
numerical representation” of progressivity. (Cowell: 7)
Indices are such a representation. Quantifying progressivity has the advantage of
permitting comparisons across time, tax systems or tax system components.
This section will present the range of distributional progressivity indices proposed in
the literature, as well as discuss literature estimating these indices. 2
3.1 Gini-based indices
The most common measure of inequality is the Gini index, G(y). Gini compares an
income distribution expressed through a Lorenz curve, L(y) with the Lorenz curve that
would obtain in perfect equality, E. As all individuals earn the same in perfect equality,
income share is equal to population share, such that Φ(y) = F (y). Figure 3 shows the
application of this for HES data.
G is the area (A) between L and E divided by the area beneath E (illustrated in
Figure 3 by areas A and B). As both Φ(y) and F (y) range from 0 to 1, the area beneath














Additionally, some authors measure concentrations of tax burden in a similar way to




t(y)). The tax share CDF, Θ(y), can be plotted against F (y) to form
a Lorenz curve for tax shares, T (y). It follows that the Gini index for taxes, G(t(y)), is
defined as:




2There are also structural progressivity indices. They differ from distributional indices by analysing
statutory rather than effective rates. Peters et al. (2009) and Doerrenberg and Peichl (2014) are examples
of papers using these kinds of index. However, we have opted for effective tax rates as these are a better
indication of progressivity as effectively experienced by households, and as the dataset allows us to
simulate tax expenditures which are not adequately encompassed by structural progressivity indices.
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Annual household gross income calculated from HBS 2010
Table 1 lists the seven main Gini-based progressivity indices used in the literature.
These are broadly distinguished between redistribution indices, focused on comparing net
and gross Gini, and relative concentration indices, focused on comparing the concentration
of income with the concentration of tax burden.
Redistribution indices “do not always offer consistent results” (Kiefer: 507). This is
illustrated by a simulation of how different indices would be affected by changes in the
tax system, income distribution or both. In doing so, he demonstrates the disparity of
tax progressivity representations by different indices. In one example, “EP indicates that
the tax system is responsible for a 7.4 percent increase in income inequality, whereas PO
indicates a 13.5 percent decrease in inequality.” (ibid: 503)
This disparity must be met by the researcher with care and deliberation in the choice of
the progressivity index with which to work. Each index is related to a different definition
of progressivity, and it is not enough to pick one or more arbitrarily. (Kiefer, 1984)
Kiefer argues that “all three [redistribution indices] have a certain intuitive appeal”,
but that Reynolds-Smolensky is “the most appropriate because it alone judges taxes
and tax changes which make equal improvements in social welfare (...) to be equally
progressive regardless of the distribution of pretax income.” (Kiefer: 509) This work
project shall thus use the Reynolds-Smolensky index, following Braz and Correia da Cunha
(2009) and Joumard et al. (2012).
As for relative concentration indices, Kiefer (1984) notes that they have the ”conve-
nient property that the measured progressivity of a group of taxes is equal to the weighted
average of the progressivity indexes for the individual taxes, where the weights are the
effective tax rates of the respective taxes.” (Keifer: 499) However, this seems to ignore
that individual taxes may not be equally progressive. For instance, VAT may be regressive
and should thus have a negative index score, however by simply applying its weight, one
would conclude that VAT is progressive.
The Suits index differs from the Kakwani and Khetan-Poddar indices in the sense that
it integrates over income rather population. The difference between this approach and P
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Table 1: Gini-based tax progressivity indices
Index Formula Source Progressivity
condition
Redistribution Indices
Effective Progression (EP) 1−G(y
n)
1−G(yg) Musgrave and Thin, 1948 EP > 1
Pechman-Okner (PO) G(y
n)−G(yg)
G(yg) Pechman and Okner, 1974 PO < 0
Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) G(yn)−G(yg) Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977 RS < 0
Relative Concentration Indices
Kakwani (P) G(t(y))−G(yg) Kakwani, 1977 P > 0
Khetan-Poddar (KP) 1−G(y
g)
1−G(t(y)) Khetan and Poddar, 1976 KP > 1
Suits (S) 1− 2
∫∞
0 F (y)[t(y)]L
′(y) Suits, 1977 3
Stroup (SH) G(t(y))−G(y)1−G(y) Stroup, 2005 SH > 0
Source: Authors’ construction, based on Kiefer (1984) and cited papers.
or KP is that it attributes weights to the difference between the concentration of taxes and
gross income, with this weight increasing proportionately with income across the popula-
tion. Thusly, the Suits index oversamples the wealthy because of their disproportionately
large income shares. (Stroup and Hubbard, 2011: 20-22)
Relative concentration indices are insensitive to the average tax rate but sensitive to
changes in income distribution even when the tax structure is unchanged. Stroup considers
this ‘useful’ as the progressive rate structure will cause redistribution to be amplified by
the increased inequality (Stroup 2005: 207). However, relative concentration indices “do
not measure the effects of the tax system on income distribution.” (Kiefer: 506) Their
meaning is unclear beyond a “restatement of their definitions: they provide indications
(...) of the cumulative distribution of taxes relative to the cumulative distribution of
income.” (ibid: 507)
In conclusion, it is preferrable to use an index which directly measures the redistribu-
tive effect of taxes on income. Thus, the Reynolds-Smolensky index will be used. To
ease presentation, and given Ginis are often presented as percentages, the index will be
presented as percentage points (equivalent to multiplying the result by 100).
3.2 Equally-Distributed Equivalent Level of Income
While the most popular inequality index, the Gini index is not without its critics. Many
have criticized the Gini index for its relative sensitivity to transfers at different income
levels. The Gini index attaches more weight to changes in income distribution near the
middle rather than at the tails of the distribution. (Cowell, 2011: 26; Kiefer, 1984: 500,
Atkinson 1970: 256) As the late Atkinson puts it, “it is not clear that such a weighting
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would necessarily accord with social values”.
Another criticism made of Gini is that it is not decomposable, in the sense that it is
possible for Gini indices to register an increase in inequality in subgroups and a decrease
in inequality overall. (Cowell: 64) These criticisms have motivated a debate on other
measures of inequality. In this sub-section I will focus on Atkinson’s index.
Atkinson (1970) proposes a social welfare function (SWF) that is nondecreasing in
incomes, symmetric, additive, strictly concave and with constant elasticity. In this social
welfare function, if a person’s income increases by 1%, her welfare weight drops by ε% of
its former value. ε is the SWF’s ‘inequality aversion’, indicating how strongly the society
values equality.
Atkinson introduces the concept of “equally distributed equivalent” level of income,
yede. This concept is the level of income that, distributed equally among individuals,
would yield the same utility-level as the existing income distribution. For inequality-
averse societies (with ε > 0), yede will be smaller than mean income, ȳ. Atkinson’s index,
I(ε, y), for a given ε, is defined by the difference from 1 of this quotient, representing
how much less income would be necessary to maintain utility levels if income were equally
distributed. This takes the following form, where yx is the x’th income level:













Societies with more inequality ceteris paribus have lower utilities and therefore would
require an even smaller share of current income equally distributed to maintain utility.
Kiefer (1984) presents two progressivity indices based on Atkinson’s index. The first,
BD(ε), y, developed by Blackorby and Donaldson (1983) takes the structure of EP in
taking the quotient of net and gross income inequality. The second, K(ε, y), which Kiefer
proposes, follows the form of the Reynolds-Smolensky in taking the difference between















For the same reasons as RS was preferred to other Gini-based indices, so K will be
used as the preferred yede based index. As I ranges from 0 to 1, it can be presented as
a percentage, with K being presented as percentage points (equivalent to multiplying the
result by 100). This is done in order to ease presentation.
4 The Portuguese tax system
This section will present the main features of the Portuguese tax system and use it to
introduce key issues in tax policy design.
4.1 Personal Income Tax
The PIT schedule, described in Table 2, applies marginal tax rates over different intervals
of the income scale, called tax brackets. The marginal tax rate, t′(y), applies only to
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income within such a bracket, with an average rate of tax being calculated for the lower
bound of the tax bracket. The progressivity of the tax system on adjusted gross income
is demonstrated by marginal taxes being greater than average taxes, t′(y) > t(y)
y
.
Table 2: Personal income tax schedule in mainland Portugal, 2009
ya t′(y) t(y)
y
ya ≤ 4, 755 10.5% –
4, 755 < ya ≤ 7, 192 13.0% 10.5%
7, 192 < ya ≤ 17, 836 23.5% 11.3%
17, 836 < ya ≤ 41, 021 34.0% 18.6%
41, 021 < ya ≤ 59, 450 36.5% 27.3%
59, 450 < ya ≤ 64, 110 40% 30.2%
ya > 64, 110 42% 30.9%
Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Guia Fiscal 2009. All incomes in e.
Without tax brackets, marginal rates would apply over an individual’s entire income.
Thus, if an individual were to increase her income from e4,755 to e4,756, their tax
liability would increase from e499.28 to e618.28 leaving their net income reduced from
e4,255.72 to e4137.72. This discontinuity in the net income function is called a ‘notch’
and represents a marginal rate above 100%. (Slemrod 2013: 259) The condition for a






< 0⇔ 1− t′(y) < 0⇔ t′y > 1 (8)
Withholding tax for employment and pension income does not work with tax brackets,
creating a notch at each new tax rate. Self-employment and property income face notches
of their own on the e10,000 threshold for withheld tax exemption, after which withheld
tax is applied over all income of that kind.
Notches introduce “an incentive for moving from a region above the cutoff to a point
just below the cutoff, thereby creating a hole in the earnings distribution on the high-tax
side and excess bunching in the earnings distribution on the low-tax side of the notch
point.” (Kleven and Waseem, 2013: 670) While there is empirical evidence of bunching
before the cutoff, strong frictions keep individuals from adjusting their labour supply
optimally. (Kleven and Waseem, 2013: 722)
Withholding tax is a relevant feature in a tax system, constituting for some a pre-
payment of their tax liability and for others an interest-free loan to the government.
The effects of withholding tax have been widely studied, inducing reduced income tax
consciousness (Van Wagstaff, 1965), reduced compliance (Shepanski and Shearer, 1995)
and increasing consumption (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995). Per the permanent income
hypothesis, there should be no effect on consumption from a change in “the timing of
cash flow with essentially no impact on lifetime resources” (ibid: 274). However, Shapiro
and Slemrod find that consumers spend this transitory income.
Withheld tax rates differ according to kind of income, professional and demographic
characteristics. For instance, withheld tax on employment income, τ(y1), differed on 4
variables as well as income level - whether the individual was disabled, married, the single
earner in the marriage, and how many dependent individuals were under his charge.
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Table 3: Tax expenditures in Portugal, 2009
Tax Expenditure Formula Can estimate?
Tax Deductions, δk
Social Security Contributions, δ11 max{s(y1i), 3888} Yes
Pay in lieu of notice to employer, δ12 N/A No
Union dues, δ13 = w max{1.5w, 0.01ygi } No
Insurance for exacting professions,δ14 min{δ14, 2096.10} No
Simplified Accounting Deduction,δ21 δ21 = 0.3y
g
2i Yes
Pension Allowance,δ31 e6000 if y3i ≤e30, 000. Tapers off at e76.153, 85 Yes
House Upkeep Costs,δ41 min{δ41, y4i} Yes
Property Tax,δ42 N/A No
Tax Credits, χ
Taxpayer Credit, χ1 χ1 = 247.5× γ Yes
Single Parent Family, χ2 χ2 =e360 if single parent family Yes
Dependent, χ3 χ3 =e180 × dependents Yes
Dependent aged below 3, χ4 χ4 =e180 × dependentes aged below 3 Yes
Healthcare, χ5 χ5 = 0.3× chealthcare Yes
Education, χ6 χ6 = min{0.3× ceducation; 720 ∗ nh} Yes
Mortgage, χ7 χ7 = min{0.3× cmortgage; depends on tax bracket} Yes
Old-Age Homes, χ8 χ8 = min{0.3× cold-age homes; 382.50} No
Source: Authors’ construction, based on the PIT tax code applicable in 2009 and PwC’s Guia Fiscal.
Some formulae have been simplified for the sake of presentation.
Capital income is subject to different forms and rates of tax depending on their origin.
While interest on capital injections, royalties, technical assistance and equipment rental
is subject to retention taxes of 15% like property taxes; dividends, interest on deposits,
bonds, repo transactions, and life insurance payouts are subject to a ‘liberatory tax’ of
20%. Earnings from participating in private equity funds or florest real estate investment
funds pay a liberatory tax of 10%.
Liberatory taxes allows a tax unit to pay all the tax on a given income upon payment,
exempting it from reporting capital income in its tax return. Capital income can be
reported, in which case it works like a withholding tax. If an individual’s marginal tax
rate is below the liberatory tax rate, it is optimal for a tax unit to report this capital
income as it will get a tax refund.
Tax progressivity analysis should look at how the tax system affects disposable income.
Thus, estimates of progressivity should not merely reflect unobserved gross and net income
but also the intermediate net-at-source position that holds between one’s paycheck and
tax return the following year. This is an innovation not found elsewhere in the literature.
Tax progressivity analysis should also concern itself with tax expenditures, which
”tend to benefit the well-off” (Joumard et al., 2012: 6) Table 3 describes the main tax
expenditures in Portugal in 2009, and whether they can be calculated using HBS data.
In Portugal, the sum of tax credits cannot exceed the tax bill meaning that it can never
be the case that t(ya) < χ. 4
4The reader may recall that there are four kinds of taxable income considered in this article: 1 -
employment; 2 - self-employment, 3 - pension income, 4 - property income, 5 - capital income.
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4.2 Social Security Contributions
Social Security contributions (SSC) are not a tax, but it is customary to include them in
tax progressivity analysis. (Piketty and Saez, 2006: 8).
In 2009, SSC for generally-employed individuals, s(yg1), was 11%, with employed pen-
sioners paying 7.8% if old-age pensioners and 8.4% if disability pensioners.
Self-employment incomes below 6 times the social benefits index, i.e. e2,515.32 are
exempt from SSC. Additionally, if an individual earns over 12 times the social benefits
index (or indexante de apoios sociais (IAS)) in employment income, or any amount in old
age or disability pension, her self-employment income is exempt from SSC.5
In 2009, self-employed individuals could choose between two SSC rates (25.4% and
32% offering different levels of social protection) applied over a fixed tax base, defined
as multiples of the IAS. An individual paid SSC on the tax base closest to her adjusted
income, ya2 , though she could request a change to neighbouring tax bases. This creates
notches as within a tax base group, the marginal effective tax rate is 0% and increasing
the tax base causes a discontinuity in the tax function. These fixed tax bases are described
in Appendix 2.
Several other regimes existed for a range of different labour market situations. How-
ever, none of these can be applied on our dataset. Pension income, property income and
capital income do not pay SSC.
4.3 Value-Added Tax
VAT is usually assumed to be regressive. As a consumption tax, the wealthy’s lower
marginal propensity to consume results in a lower lower effective VAT rate with respect
to income.
Policymakers have used reduced rates for ‘essential goods’ to attenuate VAT’s regres-
sivity. In 2009, the VAT schedule included reduced rates at 5% and 12%, and a standard
rate of 20%.
However, this is not enough to counteract the tendency of the marginal propensity
to consume to fall with income. O’Donoghue et al. (2004) compare VAT progressivity
across many countries. The authors find that Portuguese VAT is the most regressive of
12 EU countries. The progressivity of VAT in Portugal was also studied by Braz and
Correia da Cunha (2009), who show how VAT revenues have evolved over time and how
they compare with other countries. Their graphs are reproduced and updated with the
latest data for OECD countries in Figure 4 below.
Using the 2005 Household Budget Survey (HBS), Braz and Correia da Cunha (2009)
compute effective VAT rates with respect to income and consumption and a Reynolds-
Smolensky index for VAT. They find that while VAT is progressive on expenditure, declin-
ing average propensity to consume cause VAT to be regressive on income. Two previous
studies on VAT progressivity in Portugal are also identified, one (Rodrigues et al. 2002)
matching their findings and another (Albuquerque and Neves 1994) finding VAT to be
progressive in income after excluding the first income quartile.
5The social benefits index is a threshold that is used by Social Security as a base with which to
compute several low-income support transfers, as well as several tax system details, such as this one.
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Figure 4: VAT revenues in Portugal: evolution and comparison with other countries
Source: OECD Statistics
5 Data and Methodology
Calculating tax progressivity indices requires data on the distribution of gross and net
income. Martins (2016) calculated the progressivity of income tax using the few data
points obtainable from official statistics. However, it is preferable to estimate indexes on
microdata from a sample “large enough to permit estimation with small standard errors.”
(Kiefer 1984: 501)
This work project employs the 2010 wave of the Household Budget Survey (HBS),
known in Portuguese as the Inquérito às Despesas das Famı́lias. This survey includes
information from 9,489 households and 24,383 individuals ranging from demographic and
professional characteristics, income and expenditures.
The Household Budget Survey is a quinquennial survey, with 2010 being the lat-
est available wave. Information is collected about all individuals in a household, with
households being selected from randomly selected statistical areas belonging to a 2001
‘Mother-Sample’. Information is collected through in-person interviews and, in the case
of consumption data, by filing in survey papers. Information is recorded on consumption
of 199 goods and services. Weights are estimated for each household using a corrected
Horvitz-Thompson estimator.
The HBS reports all forms of monetary income as net-at-source (ys). Evidence from
SILC reveals that this is the type of income most individuals report when given the choice
(Farinha Rodrigues, 2007). Both Braz and Correia da Cunha (2009) and Rodrigues et
al. (2002) use these net at source incomes to perform their analysis. It is however “more
suitable to use gross income for the calculation of the average rate” (Braz and Correia da
Cunha: 78). Stroup too mentions that his index can be improved by using gross income
instead of adjusted gross income. This work project will estimate gross income by creating
a model to convert net-at-source income into gross income. In doing so, this work project
goes a step further than these authors, therefore allowing for a better estimation of tax
progressivity in all accounts.
When estimating household-level distributional indices such as G(y) or A(ε, y), it is
necessary to equivalise income to avoid the size of the household impacting its ranking
on the income distribution. In Portugal, official Gini estimates use the OECD modified
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Table 4: Household Budget Survey: descriptive statistics
Sample Population
n % n %
Individuals 24,383 100% 10,561,614 100%
Female 12,738 52.24% 5,513,309 52.20%
Married 12,475 51.16% 5,218,318 49.41%
Lives with a spouse 13,224 54.32% 5,579,974 52.83%
Works 9,740 39.95% 4,488,548 42.5%
Households 9,489 100% 4,044,100 100%
Mainland Portugal 7,658 80.7% 3,869,537 95.68%
1 adult, 0 dependents 1,910 20.1% 862,257 21.3%
2 adults, 0 dependents 3,071 32.4% 1,172,390 29.0%
2 adults, 1 dependents 1,107 11.7% 537,056 13.3%
2 adults, 2 dependents 963 10.1% 400,547 9.9%
1 tax unit 7,073 74.54% 3,039,437 75.16%
2 tax units 1,904 20.07% 777,615 19.23%
> 2 tax units 489 5.15% 215,946 5.34%
Only employment income 3,206 33.8% 1,520,481 37.6%
Only pension income 3,011 31.7% 1,126,642 27.9%
Has self-employment income 1,307 13.8% 587,252 14.5%
Has capital or property income 1,139 12.0% 588,684 14.6%
ȳs1h e9,768.14 – e11,377.66 –
ȳs2h e1,428.45 – e1,593.27 –
ȳs3h e2,842.23 – e2,710.56 –
ȳs4h e252.85 – e322.06 –
ȳs5h e64.01 – e86.75 –
c̄sh e18,492.87 – e20,391.21 –
Source: HBS 2010
equivalence scale, which has also been applied in this work project. Furthermore, tax-
exempt transfers must also be added to gross income before estimating distributional
indices.
Table 4 describes key descriptive statistics about the HBS.
5.1 Net-Gross Conversion
Net incomes (yn) are commonly converted into gross income (yg) (and vice-versa) using
microsimulation tools such as EUROMOD. However, Farinha Rodrigues (2007) demon-
strates these are not accurate conversions of net-at-source income to gross income, pro-
viding an alternative methodology for this conversion involving a reconstruction of gross
income from tax code information. 6
Net-at-source income can be converted into gross income by calculating the applicable
rates of SSC and withheld taxation for each individual (denoted here and hereafter as β)7
6As the reader may recall, there are five categories of income: employment (y1), self-employment (y2),
pension (y3), capital (y4) and property income (y5).
7All β notation shall have two sub-scripts, denoting kind of income (k) as defined above, and kind of
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and dividing net-at-source income by the difference of these rates from 1. This produces




















































































Employment income is earned and pays retention tax at an individual-level. Consequently,
net-gross conversion must be operated on an individual level. As the income thresholds
for progressing in the withheld tax rate are listed in gross terms, these too have to be
converted to net income terms.
The 4 demographic characteristics and income levels yield 2,052 types of individuals,
regarding employment and pension income alone. For instance, unmarried, employed
individuals with no dependents face a withheld income tax schedule with 33 rates.
Per Portuguese law, dependents are either children, stepchildren or godchildren, both
as minors and non-earnings young adults (up to age 26 earning below the minimum wage),
as well as any individuals who are permanently incapacitated for work. We assume that
all children in a household are dependents of a taxpayers in the household. There are no
cases of permanently incapacitated people in the sample. Thus, the number of dependents
can be adequately identified.
While SSC for employed individuals, s(yg1), is generally 11%, employed pensioners face
a reduced rate. Of the 6,511 pensioners in the sample, representing 2.4 million pensioners
in the population, 281 worked with a weight of 4.6% on the pensioner population. This
special case requires not only a change in the formula of translating net into gross income,
but also calculating new net income thresholds for the withheld tax rate.
Self-employment income
Converting self-employment income is rather more complex. Self-employed individuals
can opt for the organized accounting regimen or, if their income is below e150,000, the
simplified regimen. Organized accounting works like normal business accounting, with
net earnings being subject to taxation. The simplified regimen applies a tax deduction of
30% to services and 70% to goods. Available data does not allow us to distinguish those
providing services from those selling goods, nor can the organized accounting regimen be
applied. Thus, conversion will follow the simplified regimen for providing services.
taxation where 1 denotes the rate for social security contributions and 2 denotes retention tax.
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Table 5: Conversion rules for self-employment income
Combines incomes? 0 < yg2 ≤ 2, 515.32 2, 515.32 < y
g
2 ≤ 10, 000 y
g










(271 observations) (88 observations) (138 observations) (56 observations)










(1226 observations) (104 observations) (836 observations) (634 observations)
0 < ys2 ≤ 2, 515.32 1, 876.43 < ys2 ≤ 8, 083.33 ys2 > 7, 083.33
Source: Authors’ calculations. Annual individual income calculated from HBS 2010. All incomes stated
in e’s
There are 271 individuals who accumulate enough of other kinds of income to have
their self-employment income exempt from SSC. The minimum income threshold for self-
employment SSC adds an additional 104 individuals who are exempt from social security
contributions.
While individuals could choose the tax base and tax rate at which they would con-
tribute to Social Security, information is not available on what people actually paid. One
has then to assume that individuals paid the lower rate of contributions (25.4%) appli-
cable in 2009, and did so against the the tax base associated with their income level. In
the case of notches, I will assume that individuals chose to pay according to the lower tax
base.
VAT and withheld tax is charged if self-employed incomes exceeds e10,000.Only 351
sampled individuals exceeded this threshold, weighing 176,526 individuals. Depending on
one’s occupation, VAT and withheld tax rates differ. For instance, while in 2009 the VAT
rate and withheld tax rate for ‘individual businessmen’ was 20% and 10% respectively,
‘liberal professionals’ (lawyers, doctors, etc.) were exempt from VAT but faced a 20%
withheld tax rate. These occupational differences cannot however be reliably identified
through either the aggregate economic activity classifications (CAE) or the aggregate
professional classifications (CNP) available in the dataset. Other special cases abound
(members of governing bodies, royalties, technical assistance, etc.), however none of these
cases can be differentiated using available data either. Consequently, all observations must
be treated equally using a 20% VAT rate and 10% retention rate on incomes exceeding
e10,000.
The six cases of net-gross conversion for self-employment income are summarized in
Table 5.
Beyond the notches created by the fixed base SSC system, there are notches after the
SSC exemption and after the VAT and withheld tax exemption. Notches imply an overlap
between the net income range for each of the conversion cases presented above, making
it possible for individuals within these net income ranges to fall within two distinct con-
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version cases, causing ambiguity over how to convert these cases. These are summarized
in Table 6 below.
Table 6: Notch-caused conversion ambiguities
Combines incomes
9000 < ys2 ≤ 10, 000
11 observations 0.03% of population 0.54% of self-employed
Does not combine incomes
7, 083.33 < ys2 ≤ 8, 083.33
157 observations 0.61% of population 9.67% of self-employed
Does not combine incomes
1, 876.43 < ys2 ≤ 2, 515.32
36 observations 0.12% of population 1.89% of self-employed
Total 204 observations 0.76% of population 12.10% of self-employed
Source: Authors’ calculations. Annual individual income obtained from HBS 2010
Calibration to total income or mean income from administrative data could, in theory,









2i) in official statistics for both total
(e6.49 billion in HBS v. e6.08 billion in Autoridade Tributária) and mean income (e9054
v. e6281). Conversion to gross income should increase total income, not reduce it.
Consequently, no calibration is possible.
As individuals who report self-employment income have to fill in their self-employment
income slip monthly, it is plausible that in this case, gross rather than net at source figures
were given. This is so assumed.
Pension Income
A variety of pension income is available in the dataset, including old-age (both contrib-
utory and social), disability and survivor’s pensions, as well as unemployment benefits,
sickpay and education and training benefits such as scholarships. In order to distinguish
between tax-paying and tax-exempt transfers, hereafter ’pensions’ shall refer to tax-paying
pensions while ’transfers’ shall refer to tax-exempt benefits.
Property Income
According to article 8 of the Personal Income Tax Code, property income is defined as
the rents received or made available to property-owners. According to Decree-Law 42/91,
the retention tax on property income in 2009 was 15%.
As discussed above, the retention tax threshold creates a notch and notches create
ambiguities in how to convert data. Furthermore, disparity between administrative and
survey data do not allow for calibration in this case either. While tax authorities report
e2.9 billion in property income, only e1.30 billion is reported in the survey. Oversampling
at the top might approximate survey information to reality. As a means of approximating
property income to administrative figures, all net-at-source income above e8,500 will be
considered as equivalent to a gross income of e10,000.
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Capital Income
Regardless of whether individuals include capital income in their tax return or settle for
the liberatory tax, there is an immediate retention of capital income. However, without
further information, one cannot settle on the applicable rate, τ ′(y4).
Capital income is only available in aggregate terms, making it impossible to convert
each form of capital income in such a way as to calculate the specific rate for the specific
kind of capital income, or even settle for a modal kind of capital income and its respective
rate.
Calibration is once again implausible due to the large disparity between administrative
and survey-reported data. While the survey reports e351 million, tax returns in 2009
reported only e78 million in capital income. The reason for such a dramatic over-reporting
is because individuals need not report their capital income in their annual tax returns,
as explained above. Furthermore, no administrative information was found of which was
the modal category of capital income.
The PIT schedule for mainland Portugal has no rate below 10% in 2009, meaning a
liberatory tax of 10% is always preferable to including capital income in one’s tax return.
When the liberatory tax rate is 20%, it would be rational for taxpayers with adjusted
incomes below e7,192 to report their capital income. Assuming τ ′(y4) = 20%, with the
possibility of incorporating capital income entirely in PIT returns, offers the best scope
for analysing the effects of this feature of the tax system.
5.2 Tax Unit
Income in HBS is available in either household or individual terms. However, individuals
can file tax returns in tax units, with some households containing several tax units.
It is necessary to correctly identify each tax unit in order to accurately calculate
tax liability. This problem is also identified by Rodrigues et al. in a similarly-minded
analysis of SILC data (Rodrigues et al., 2012: 172) Treating households as tax units
would overestimate adjusted gross income, accessing higher levels of marginal tax and
thus overestimating tax liability as well.
It is not sufficient to just match married couples. Since 2000, spouses in civil part-
nerships may file taxes jointly in Portugal. Data only shows, however, if individuals live
with a spouse. While we cannot know whether they are in civil partnerships and eligible
for filing jointly, all couples so identified in the HBS are assumed to file jointly.
While individual-level incomes can be added for all individuals in a tax unit, property
and capital income are only available at a household-level. As no information allows us
to know which individual brought this income to the household, property and capital
income were allocated to individuals in the household proportionally to their respective



















k,h, k = 4, 5. Finally, we compute the tax unit’s capital and property income
as the sum of the imputed values for individuals in that tax unit.
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A similar problem could occur with tax credits (χ), which are calculated on a number of
characteristics which are only available at a household level such as number of dependents
or consumption of specific goods. While the income share method could be used to impute
these values for each individual and then aggregating to tax units, this is not necessary
unless tax-unit level distributional analyses are desired. As t(y) will be aggregated per
household in any case, we need only household-level χ. Care must be taken, however, to
adequately calculate limits as tax credit limits apply per tax unit and not per household.
6 Behavioural Responses to Taxation
Literature and theory both suggest that agents choose their labour supply bearing in
mind the net income function, such that the marginal disutility of work equals marginal
utility of net income. (Saez 2009) The behavioural response to the tax function can be
verified by evidence of bunching (Saez, 2009: 1).
Bunching is evidence that taxes are distorting an individual’s optimal labour supply.
This is not only a static effect, as labour market agents will consider notches in negotiating
pay rises. Like all distortions, this implies an efficiency loss which will be shared by
workers, employers and, insofar as this efficiency loss may affect the price of goods and
services, consumers.
6.1 Bunching at Notches
While most literature focuses on responses to kinks in the net income function, our review
above of the Portuguese tax system in 2009 identified a variety of notches. These include:
• Employment and pension income: retention tax rates are applied as average rather
than marginal taxes.
• Self-employment income:
1. Exemption of VAT and retention tax on gross incomes below e10,000 (yg2 > 10, 000);
2. Exemption on Social Security taxes for incomes below 50% of the Social Benefits
Index (yg2 > 2, 515.32);
3. Social Security fixed tax base system creating discontinuous tax ‘plateaus’ with 0%
effective tax rate and discontinuities (s′(y) > 1) when crossing plateaus.
• Property income: Application of retention tax on income above e10,000.
Evidence of bunching is demonstrated graphically by inspecting kernel density histograms
for humps. Bunching is also verified by estimating intensive elasticities of income with
respect to the marginal tax rate.
However, measurement error in survey data and imputed data as resulting from the
net-gross conversion model produces inconsistent estimates of bunching. (Hausman 1982)
Furthermore, bunching is imprecise as agents do not fully control their incomes. In this
case, we should expect bunching to happen not exactly before notches, but arround them.
(Saez 2009) For this reason, only graphical evidence of bunching around notches will be
produced.
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Bunching at Employment Income Notches
Source: Authors’ calculations. Annual individual income obtained from HBS 2010
Bunching behaviour is only clearly identified using gross or adjusted income. However,
all of the identified notches take place at withholding at source. This caused ambiguities
in converting observed net-at-source incomes to unobserved gross income, and does not
reveal the distribution of gross income around notches. Thus, all graphical evidence refers
to net-at-source income, with notch areas marked by pairs of red lines.
Employment income
As different rates and therefore different notches are present depending on the various
demographic characteristics, it is difficult to present notches for all of the over 2000
tipologies of individuals. However, pensioners cannot adjust their labour supply to affect
their pension income. Thus, we have opted to do so for the most frequent case in the
employment income distribution: an individual, who is married, is not the single earner
and lives in mainland Portugal with one dependent child.
Inspection of each of the 31 notch areas in employment income leaves only two as
striking more substantial disruption in the density function. These are presented in Figure
5. Bunching is particularly significant around the first withheld tax notch where withheld
tax is minimized, in line with Saez (2009).
Self-employment income
Figure 6 shows the distribution of net-at-source self-employment income with notch areas
marked by pairs of red lines. Some bunching does appear to exist before both exemption
notches, while evidence is far less clear with the Social Security fixed tax base system,
partly due to the width of notch areas.
Property income
Property income above e10,000 pays retention tax of 15% which implies a net-at-source
income of e8,500. Therefore, those receiving gross property incomes between e8500 and
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Annual household income and tax unit adjusted income obtained from
HBS 2010
10,000 will be in the same net-at-source density bin (8500 < yn4 ≤ 10000) as those receiving
between e10,000 and e11,765.
The net-at-source distribution is shown in Figure 7. No bunching is evident, partly
because the distribution appears to reach its maximum at much smaller property income.
6.2 Bunching at Kinks
It is also possible to view if there is bunching at kinks in the net income function, in line
with Saez (2009). Kinks in the net income function represent changes in the marginal tax
rate. Marginal tax rates apply over adjusted gross income, with respective application
of couple quotient. Therefore, in order to visualize bunching at kinks, it is necessary to
inspect kernel density graphs for adjusted gross income. Red lines were added at income
levels where marginal tax rate progresses.
There is little evidence of bunching at kinks. In effect, the density reaches a peak at
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e2825. While this may be construed as evidence of bunching, it is more likely to be a
reflection of labour market structure. A small hump is visible in the adjusted gross income
distribution just before the e41,021 threshold, as shown in Figure 7. This result, while
weak, is robust to different income specifications (i.e. without tax deductions, without
couple quotient)
7 Results
The successful conversion of net-at-source incomes to gross incomes constitutes per se
an improvement from the literature. By using gross income rather than net-at-source
income (as Braz and Correia did) or adjusted income (as used by Stroup), the effect of the
retention system and of tax deductions can be incorporated into progressivity measures.
This model also represents an improvement on Rodrigues et al. (2012) in terms of the
identifying tax units. Comparisons between our estimates and tax authority statistics are
included in Table 7 below.
Table 7: Comparison of Estimatation Results with Tax Authority Statistics
Statistic Estimated Results Tax Authority Statistics Comparison
u with yg > 0 4,778,780 4,654,114 +2.68%
u with ya > 0 3,926,367 4,159,754 -5.61%
u with t(y) > 0 1,445,797 2,007,821 -28.0%
% of u with yg > 0 ∧ t(y) > 0 30.3% 43.1% -12.9pp∑
yg 8.97× 1010 8.51× 1010 +5.41%∑
yg1 6.00× 1010 5.68× 1010 +5.60%∑
yg2 6.49× 109 6.08× 109 +6.69%∑
yg3 2.14× 1010 1.85× 1010 +15.5%∑
yg4 1.42× 109 2.92× 109 −51.3%∑
yg5 4.34× 108 7.8× 107 +456%∑
χ 4.20× 109 3.74× 109 +12, 3%∑
χ(dependents) 5.41× 108 3.40× 108 +59.1%∑
χ(healthcare) 1.44× 109 6.59× 108 +119%∑
χ(mortgage) 3.79× 108 5.62× 108 −32.6%∑
χ(education) 3.04× 109 2.99× 108 +917%
Source: Annual population income. Authors’ calculations using HBS 2010 and income tax statistics from
Autoridade Tributária
Our tax simulation model appears to more accurately simulate the tax system than
that presented in Rodrigues et al. (2012). Rodrigues et al. estimate 75.6% of households
paid PIT in 2009 while administrative data for 2009 state that only 43.1% of fiscal units
pay income tax. Our model compares favourably with this, as shown in Table 7, estimating
34.4% households and 27.3% of fiscal units paying income tax. While one would expect
this to be due to traditional underreporting of income in surveys (Moore and Welniak
2000), Table 7 seems to suggest that overestimation of tax credits could also play a large
role. Another reason for our model providing a smaller percentage of tax-paying tax units
is the lack of oversampling at the top.
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The reader will recall both Gini indices and Atkinson indices are calculated from
equivalised income.
Personal income tax and social security taxes are pre-paid through retention tax,
resulting in net-at-source income (ys), and subsequently paid in full, resulting in net
income (yn). These are, therefore, two distinct distributions allowing for two distinct
progressivity measures.
RSys = G(y
s)−G(yg), and Kys(ε) = I(ε, yg)− I(ε, ys) (15)
The Gini index for net equivalised income (G(yn)) was estimated at 0.369, which is
slightly above INE’s ‘official’ 0.337 obtained using SILC data.
It is estimated that, in 2009, RSyn was -4.80pp, while RSys was -5.20pp, indicating
a progressive tax system in both tax collection moments. This is also similar to the
progressivity estimates obtained by Rodrigues et al. (2012) who estimate a RS index of
-4.2. It is not entirely clear whether the authors’ ‘net income’ is referring to final net
income (yn) or net-at-source income (ys).
By isolating the effects of a tax on the income distribution, it is possible to estimate
indices for individual taxes or various tax scenarios. In each case, the Gini/Atkinson index
of gross equivalent income is subtracted from the Gini/Atkinson index of income net of
such taxes. It is from this baseline distribution that tax liabilities must be subtracted in
order to measure the specific redistributive effects of a tax.
7.1 Personal Income Tax
This section will demonstrate the measures of progressivity of the personal income tax in
Portugal in 2009, as well as many features of this tax. The estimated progressivity indices
are displayed in Table 8. The reader will recall that the progressivity conditions for the
Reynolds-Smolensky and Kiefer indices are RS < 0 and K > 0.
Just as above net-at-source and net were distinguished, so can the PIT-related part of
each of these have their progresivity estimated. Gross income subtracted only of withheld
income tax and final income tax will be denoted by yτ and yt(y).
ys = yg − τ(y)− s(y), and yn = yg − t(y)− s(y) (16)
yτ = ys + s(y) = yg − τ(y), and yt(y) = yn + s(y) = yg − t(y) (17)
RSτ(y) = G(y
τ )−G(yg), and RSt(y) = G(yt(y))−G(yg) (18)
A first inspection at the progression of the effective tax rate curves, in Figure 8 below,
shows that these taxes are progressive, but does not permit comparison between two very
similar curves.
Tax liability and thus net income are affected by not only marginal taxes (t′(y)) but
also tax deductions (δi) and tax credits (χ). These carry a distribution of tax savings
which can be measured in order to investigate the progressivity of the tax expenditure
system. Thus, a range of progressivity indices can be calculated.
Income net of personal income taxes is defined thusly:
yt(y) = yg − t(y) = yg − [t(ya)− χ] = yg + χ− t(yg − δ) (19)
Thus, if tax deductions and/or tax credits were not to exist, net income would be:
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g + χ− t(yg), and yt(y)χ=0 = yn − χ, and y
t(y)
δ+χ=0 = y
g − t(yg) (20)
The progressivity of tax deductions or tax expenditures should be understood as their
contribution to PIT’s progressivity index.8 This contribution can be estimated as dif-
ference of progressivity indices for the tax system with these features and for the tax
system without these features. This simplifies to the gain/loss in inequality from abolish-
ing these features, assuming no behavioural response to such tax reform. For instance,
for tax deductions, the Reynolds-Smolensy index would have the following form:
RSδ = RSt(y);δ −RSt(y);δ=0 = G(yt(y))−G(yg)− [G(yt(y)δ=0)−G(y
g)] = G(yt(y))−G(yt(y)δ=0)
(21)
Table 8 presents the estimated progressivity indices for each of these features of per-
sonal income taxation.
7.2 Social Security Contributions
Social Security contributions (SSC), unlike PIT, is collected in one moment for each
kind of income. Therefore, this allows us to estimate only one at-large value for SSC
progressivity, which is found to be progressive in all progressivity index specifications.
Social Security in employment is proportional, with the exception being a lower rate
for pensioners. The self-employed, however, face a notch-riddled fixed tax base structure,
as explained above. One should expect this fixed tax base structure to be worse than a
normal notch as not only does the implicit tax rate exceed 1 at the threshold (s′(y) > 1)
but the implicit tax rate within the relevant income intervals is 0.
In order to obtain an estimate of the progressivity of this feature, one has to compare
the existing system with a counterfactual system (s2(y) = σ2(y)). For simplicity, let
8Pfähler (1990) does this for the Kakwani index. His methodology cannot be emulated due to the
significant differences between the Kakwani index and the Reynolds-Smolensky index.
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this system be termed σ(y) for all kinds of income. The best counterfactual is that self-
employment SSC were to follow the same structure as SSC for employment, that is a
constant marginal tax rate across the entire income range. Thus, the RS index for this
case is defined by the following expression:
RSs2(y) = RSs(y) −RSσ(y) = G(yg − s(y))−G(yg − σ(y)) (22)
The estimated progressivity of SSC and of the fixed tax base system is presented in
Table 8. The progressivity index for the latter is not significantly different from zero,
indicating no effect on progressivity.
7.3 Value-Added Tax
In order to estimate the progressivity of VAT, it is necessary to attribute VAT rates
to goods and services. While the extent of aggregation does not allow us to perfectly
discriminate VAT rates on each good, it allows for significant detail.
Calculating progressivity for VAT assumes that its incidence falls entirely on con-
sumers. While legal incidence of VAT is with businesses, theory suggests that economic
incidence lies proportionally on the rigid side of the market. However, for the sake of this
progressivity exercise, we will assume that VAT’s incidence falls entirely on the consumer.
The progressivity of value-added tax is estimated in the literature over income and
over consumption. The literature considers the progression of the average rate of VAT
over income and over expenditure. This is illustrated in Figure 9 below.
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modified scale.
Visual inspection suggests that VAT is mostly progressive with regards to consump-
tion, and generally regressive with regards to income. Inspection of the average propensity
to consume, illustrated in Appendix 4, one witnesses that lower-income households con-
sume a far greater proportion of their income (often above 100%) than their high-income
counterparts.
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The progressivity indices for VAT can be calculated by the same mechanism as for
other simulations above. The regressivity of VAT is equal to the inequality loss that would
result from VAT being abolished. The results for this is included in Table 8.
Table 8: Progressivity Indices Results
RS K(0.5) K(1) K(2)
















































































Source: Authors’ calculations from HBS data from annual equivalised income, using Distributional Anal-
ysis Stata Package (DASP). Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
8 Conclusion
This work project sought to find out how progressive Portugal’s taxes were. Using data
from the 2010 Household Budget Survey, it converted net-at-source income to gross in-
come, identified tax units and calculated their respective tax liability. The Reynolds-
Smolensky index and Kiefer indices were computed to measure progressivity not only of
the tax system as a whole, but of individual taxes and even particular features of these.
This work project improves on a number of other progressivity estimates. Building
a tailor-made net-gross conversion is an improvement on microsimulation tools such as
EUROMOD or the use of adjusted gross or net-at-source income. While not without its
flaws, the tax simulation model performs better against the benchmark of administrative
data than other models for Portugal 2009. Finally, progressivity is analysed not only with
regards to final tax payments but also with regards to retention taxes.
Portugal’s tax system was found to be generally progressive. We found less inequality
in net-at-source income than in net income. Tax deductions and tax credits were found to
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be regressive, with tax deductions being more regressive than tax credits. Social security
contributions were found to be progressive. Lastly, VAT was found to be regressive on
income, while generally progressive on consumption. These findings are robust to different
progressivity indices.
Behavioural response to taxes was also assessed through graphical inspection of ys
densities. Three cases of bunching were identified: (i) at the first τ ′(y1) threshold, (ii)at
the e28,000 τ ′(y1) threshold, and (iii) at the τ ′(y2) exemption threshold.
Limitations and Further Research
One way to improve this research would be to implement it across years or tax jurisdic-
tions (i.e. countries). This would provide a means of comparison and greatly enrich the
interpretation of my findings. Another area for further research is implementing decom-
position of the progressivity of different taxes into vertical redistribution (V), horizontal
inequality or unequal treatment of equals (H) and reranking effects (R), as proposed by
Aronson et al. (1994) and implemented by Braz and Correia da Cunha (2009) for VAT.
A third limitation of this work project is the quality of the dataset. While a more
detailed survey might arguably provide further information, a better route would be
administrative data. A number of countries provide administrative data on taxation
which provide more accurate and detailed information on the income, tax liabilities and
consumption of tax units. Furthermore, the Portuguese government does already provide
administrative data on labour market (Quadros de Pessoal) and firm accounts (Sistema
Nacional de Contas Integradas and Informação Empresarial Simplificada) to protocolled
researchers.
Administrative data is particularly essential to extend this research to wealth and
property taxes. Absence of these taxes is a fourth and major limitation to this article.
Piketty and Saez note how taking these taxes into account changed the interpretation of
the evolution of tax progressivity in France, United Kingdom and United States. (Piketty
and Saez, 2006: 21) Other survey data (i.e. Household Finance and Consumption Survey
[ISFF]) do not provide necessary information for the estimation of these taxes’ progres-
sivity, namely property valuation for tax purposes rather than market valuation.
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9 Appendix
Stroup Index








From the Gini equation, we know that:
G(y) = 1− 2
∫ 1
0




Rearranging for the expressions in Stroup’s formula:∫ 1
0
L(y)dy = 0.5× (1−G(y))
∫ 1
0
T (y)dy = 0.5× (1−G(t(y)))
Substituting these into Stroup’s index:














Self-employment SSC tax base
Table 9: Self-employment SSC tax base, monthly values
×IAS Tax Base ya2 y
g
2
0 0.5 e209.61 e146.73-e419.21 e209.61-e598.87
1 1 e419.22 e419.22-e524.02 e598.88-e748.59
2 1.5 e628.83 e524.03-e733.63 e748.60-e1,048.04
3 2 e834.44 e733.64-e943.24 e1,048.05-e1,347.48
4 2.5 e1,048.05 e943.25-e1152.85 e1,347.49-e1,646.92
5 3 e1,257.66 e1152.86-e1467.26 e1,646.93-e2,096.09
6 4 e1,676.88 e1467.27-e1886.48 e2,096.10-e2,694.97
7 5 e2,096.10 e1886.49-e2305.7 e2,694.98-e3,293.86
8 6 e2,515.32 e2305.71-e2934.53 e3,293.87-e4,192.19
9 8 e3,353.76 e2934.54-e3772.97 e4,192.20-e5,389.96
10 10 e4,192.20 e3772.98-e4611.41 e5,389.97-e6,587.73
11 12 e5,030.64 e4611.42-∞ e6,587.74-∞
Source: Authors’ calculations based on phone interviews with Social Security authority.
Evolution of VAT schedule in mainland Portugal
Average Propensity to Consume
28
Table 10: Evolution of VAT schedule in mainland Portugal
Date Reduced Rate 1 Reduced Rate 2 Standard Rate Increased Rate
01/01/1986 0 8 16 30
01/02/1988 0 8 17 30
24/03/1992 - 5 16 30
01/01/1995 - 5 17 -
01/07/1996 5 12 17 -
05/06/2002 5 12 19 -
01/07/2005 5 12 21 -
01/07/2008 5 12 20 -
01/07/2010 6 13 21 -
01/01/2011 6 13 23 -
Source: European Commission, 2017
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Source: Authors’ calculations, using HBS 2010. Annual household income, equivalised using the OECD
modified scale.
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